I affirm. Deadly force is force likely or intended to cause death or great bodily harm (Black’s Law)

**One**, moral permissibility is when there are no opposing moral concerns.

Hanser ‘05

Matthew Hanser, “Permissibility and Practical Inference,” Ethics Vol. 115, No. 3 (April 2005), pp. 443-470. B.A. Philosophy, Rice University, 1984. Ph.D. Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, 1993 H.L.A. Hart Fellow at University College, Oxford, and at the Oxford Centre for Ethics & Philosophy of Law, Spring 2009

An agent’s reason for doing something purports to justify his doing of that for which it is a reason. We can represent the normative nature of this relation by thinking of actions as embodying practical inferences: when an agent fs for reason R, it is as if he reasons, “R; therefore let me f!” (I say it is as if he reasons this way because I mean to imply nothing about what thoughts, if any, must precede or accompany action. One certainly needn’t say to oneself, “R; therefore let me f!” in order for R to be one’s reason for fing.) But if actions embody inferences, then actions can be evaluated with respect to the quality of these inferences. That is the idea upon which the inferential account of permissibility seizes. As a preliminary formulation, we might say that according to the inferential account, an agent acts permissibly if and only if the practical inference embodied by his action is a good one—if and only if, that is, the premises of that inference justify, or provide adequate grounds for, the acceptance of its conclusion. But this cannot be quite right as an account of moral permissibility. An agent who has insufficient reason for doing what he does need not on that account be acting morally impermissibly. So let us say that **an agent acts morally permissibly** if and only **if his [or her] action embodies a[n]** practical **inference whose** premises’ **justifying force**, if any, **is not** successfully undermined or **defeated by any moral considerations.** Let us call such practical inferences “permissible.” An agent acts permissibly, then, if and only if his action embodies a permissible practical inference.6 (For the sake of simplicity I shall some- times, in what follows, revert to the preliminary formulation of the view, omitting the qualification about moral considerations.)

Kagan ‘89 furthers:

Kagan, Shelley [Professor of Philosophy at Yale University]. The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 65-66. 1989.

For a given reaction to be morally required is for it to be supported by a morally decisive reason. Along similar lines, we can say that a given reaction is morally forbidden if and only if there is a morally decisive reason for not reacting in that way. Furthermore, if we make the plausible assumption that an action is permitted provided that it is not forbidden, we can say that a given reaction is morally permitted if and only if there is no morally decisive reason for not reacting in the given way. Note that on this account what makes a reaction permitted is the absence of a certain kind of reason—i.e., the absence of a morally decisive reason for not reacting in that way. Thus a reaction’s being permitted does not entail that there is any sort of reason at all which supports reacting in that way. It is not the presence of a ‘morally adequate’ reason which grounds permission; rather, it is the absence of a reason sufficient to ground a prohibition.

Thus, skepticism, presumption, and permissibility flow Aff, as the resolution itself is not making a moral statement, but rather saying, no potential moral qualm could be raised.

Furthermore, my evidence is from qualified professors of Philosophy, whereas other definitions, such as the Elliott definition, come from those who specialize in Practical Ethics rather than Morality.

Prefer evidence from philosophers to arguments made by debaters because

A: That indicates it’s the way terms are actually used, meaning it’s the most predictable interpretation, whereas debaters’ interpretations are just constructed to win the round.

B: Philosophical papers have to undergo rigorous review by peers, meaning that they have consistent logic. Even if a debater has some sort of apparent logic for a claim, prefer philosophers’ logic because they undergo numerous tests to get published.

**And,** Skepticism doesn’t deny the possibility of the statement because the meaning of language is derived from our interpretations, regardless of a true referent. That’s how we have the capabilities of making abstract statements about things that don’t necessarily exist.

**And,** even if it did deny the existence of those terms, that would just deny the existence of the terms prohibition and obligation, meaning that you would affirm because that would make it permissible as per my definitions.

**And,** if that’s not true, it would just trigger presumption because the resolution wouldn’t be true or false, but rather nonsensical.

I contend deliberate use of deadly force as a response to repeated domestic violence is permissible.

**Sub-point A is the Methodology of Morals:**

**First, the way in which we use language indicates that morality is perceived as objective. As such, for a “moral” prohibition to take form, it must be objective.**

Moral statements are lexically indicated as objectively true when we make moral statements as we attribute truth conditions to moral statements

Shafer-Landau ‘03

Shafer-Landau, Russ, Moral Realism: a Defense, pg. 23, 2003

Only Cognitivism straightforwardly preserves ordinary talk of moral truth. We appear to take[s] at face value such locutions as ‘it is true that infanticide is wrong’. We allow for the possibility of moral mistake and often characterize it as a case in which a person speaks falsely, or has a false belief. When we experience moral perplexity, we often see ourselves as engaged in a search for the truth about who is in the right, or where our obligations lie. We can well explain the point and persistence of moral disagreement by attributing to agents the presupposition that there is a right answer awaiting discovery. Where they convinced that there was no truth of the matter, most interlocutors would see their continued disagreement as pointless; as pointless as, say, entering an intractable debate about whether red or orange was really the most beautiful colour. Relatedly, we believe that moral argument can take the logical form of other kinds of argument. **We think of** sentential operators in **moral sentences as truth-functional. The law of excluded middle holds** as strictly **for moral discourse** as for non-moral discourse. We recognize the validity of modus ponens inferences that incorporate moral claims as premises. We freely use the logical connectives in making and evaluating moral claims. **We standardly assess moral arguments as valid or invalid**, sound or unsound**. This indicates** at least a tacit assumption **that truth-preservation is an aim of moral argument.** Cognitivists have ready, straightforward analyses of such a view of moral argument. Non-cognitivists don’t.

And, morality is perceived as objective because most people are religious believers that assert the objectivity of moral statements.

Leiter ‘10

Brian Leiter. December 15, 2010 at 10:02 pm. <http://onthehuman.org/2010/12/objective-moral-truths/>. Brian Leiter (born 1963) is an [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) [philosopher](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) and legal scholar who is currently Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence at the [University of Chicago Law School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Chicago_Law_School), and founder and Director of Chicago's new Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human Values. He taught for two years at the [University of San Diego School of Law](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_San_Diego_School_of_Law), and was also a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at the [University of California, San Diego](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_San_Diego). He earned his [Bachelor of Arts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bachelor_of_Arts) in philosophy from [Princeton University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University) and both his [J.D.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juris_Doctor) and [Ph.D.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Philosophy) (in philosophy) from the [University of Michigan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Michigan).

Four worries about Joshua Knobe’s characteristically provocative and creative research: 1. Joshua complains that, “No real evidence is offered for the initial assumption [by philosophers] that ordinary people treat moral claims as getting at something objective.” Often armchair confidence about what the folk think is suspect, as the experimental philosophers have shown more than once. But in this case, the confidence seems quite warranted by evidence. The evidence that the “folk” think moral claims are objective follows from the conjunction of (a) the “folk” tend to be religious believers, and (b) almost every major religious tradition is committed to the objectivity of moral judgments. (b) can’t seriously be disputed, so the only question would be about (a). A large number of European “folk” aren’t religious believers (God bless them!), and it would be interesting to know how that affects their view of the objectivity of morality. But a large number of the American, and Indian, and Indonesian, and Egyptian, and Iranian, and Mexican, and Brazilian folk are religious believers, and their religions are pretty clear about the objectivity of morality. God and Allah, for example, tend not to be moral relativists, so it would be surprising if their adherents were.

Thus, arguments that prove relativist or any anti-realist theories don’t negate the resolution. The negative must win that morality objectively proves killing as a response to domestic violence is impermissible.

Second, arguments that prove morality is subjective would affirm because:

**A:** The only people epistemically capable of evaluating the impact of domestic violence are the victims, as they’re the only ones who’ve experienced it. Since the victim in the resolution has taken the action of deadly force, they necessarily accept it as permissible.

**B:** The resolution would still be proven true. Under some conception of morality, it’s permissible, meaning that even if the victim doesn’t believe it’s permissible, it is under some conception. Subjective conceptions of morality allow for moral statements to be both true and false.

This also means that if the Neg proves subjective morality, they place infinite necessary but insufficient burdens on themselves, because arguments that prove impermissibility don’t deny the truth of permissibility.

**Third,**

Coherent accounts of moral truths center around best explanations

Leiter 2

Brian Leiter (2001). Moral Facts and Best Explanations. Social Philosophy and Policy, 18 , pp 79-101 doi:10.1017/S0265052500002910

Any account of what makes an explanation "best" or "better" is bound to be contentious, but if the realist is to defend moral facts on explanatory grounds, then he must take some stand on this question. 1 propose that we start with two intuitively plausible criteria for theory-choice articulated in a well-known paper by philosopher Paul Thagard: *consilience and simplicity.*10 *Consilience,* according to Thagard, has to do with "*how much* a theory explains." Thus, "one theory is more consilient than another if it explains more classes of facts [and]than the other does."n *Simplicity* in a theory is only a virtue when it does not come at the expense of consilience. Thus, "a simple consilient theory not only must explain a range of facts; it must explain those facts without making a host of assumptions with narrow application."12 Notice that ontological or theoretical economy is not necessarily a virtue on this view: ontologies and theories can be complex as long as they contribute to consilience.13 On this account, one explanation will be better than another if it explains more and does so with comparable or greater simplicity. One might, of course, wonder why the moral realist should care about these criteria.14 One reason is surely that they are intuitively plausible. Simplicity is, of course, a mainstay on any checklist of desiderata for theory-choice, while whole theories of explanation have been built around the idea that explanations should advance understanding by unifying disparate phenomena15—something that consilient theories, theories that explain different classes of phenomena in terms of some basic explanatory mechanism, would seem to do. At least for some moral realists, however, a second reason for taking these criteria seriously seems compelling—namely, that they are, as Thagard argues, criteria operative in the history of science. Since for many moral realists—particularly those concerned to vindicate the explanatory power of moral properties—moral inquiry and moral epistemology should be continuous with scientific inquiry and scientific epistemology, it seems fair to expect that on their accounts, moral explanations should satisfy the criteria that inform theory-choice in science.16 In any event, it is clear that to assess the explanatory potency of moral facts we need to have some criteria for assessing moral explanations, and Thagard's seem like reasonable candidates. Let the burden fall upon the moral realist to show why these criteria are inappropriate in the case of moral realism—and to suggest appropriate alternatives as well.

The notion of moral rules indicates that they would have to be distinct from natural or conceptually necessary conditions as we perceive moral rules as having solely normative force.

Railton ‘03

Railton, Peter. Facts and Values: Essays Towards A Morality of Consequence. 2003. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

Authority is an impressive thing. At least, it is when it works. We speak of rules binding us, or being in force, even when we would rather not comply. This suggests a[n] certain image of what it would be to explain or ground normative authority. Sheer force is sometimes called upon to enforce norms, but it is not much of a model of the “coercive power” of norms as such. Rousseau noted that “If force compels obedience, there is no need to invoke a duty to obey.”3 A sufficiently great actual force simply is irresistible. Familiar rules and oughts, even stringent ones, are not like that – we can and do resist them, as Kant noted: The moral law is holy (inviolable). Man is certainly unholy enough, but humanity in his person must be holy to him (CPrR 87). Clearly the must here is not the must of something irresistible – the moral law is normatively, not actually, “inviolable.” Since an ought is to apply to us even when we fall short, its force (and recognition thereof) must leave that option open. If “guidance by norms” is to play a nontrivial role in explaining an individual’s or a group’s behavior, then the normative domain must be a domain of freedom as well as “bindingness.” This need for a “possibility of incorrectness” is often remarked upon in philosophical discussions of normativity, usually in connection with physical or causal possibility. But it is no less important to make room for the logical or conceptual possibility of error. It is sometimes said, for example, that a free agent is by definition guided by rationality or a good will. There is no objection to this kind of definition as such, but it does not capture the sense of “freedom” we need here. Consider a more mundane example. Suppose that I have written you a letter and have spelled ‘correspondence’ correctly, rather than as the often-seen ‘correspondance.’ You, the reader, aware that my spelling is at best uncertain, remark upon my unexpected success to a colleague and wonder aloud whether it was accident or competence. You are, in effect, assessing two explanations, according to one of which I spelled it with an ‘e’ by chance, while according to the other I did it on purpose (though perhaps without explicit deliberation) – as a manifestation of my internal- ization of, and deference to, this particular norm of English spelling. Sup- pose your friend replies, “No, there simply is no question of why Railton spelled ‘correspondence’ with an ‘e’. Spelling is a normative concept – acts of spelling constitutively involve satisfying the norms of spelling. So he couldn’t have spelled the word with an ‘a’ – to have written ‘correspon- dance’ wouldn’t have counted as a spelling of ‘correspondence’ at all.” Now there certainly is a “normative sense” of spelling, according to which ‘correspondance’ cannot count as a spelling of ‘correspondence.’ In this sense, it is analytic that spelling is correct, and even losers in spelling bees never spell incorrectly. That’s why, thought it may sound odd to say so, when we ask why or how someone spelled correctly we typically are not using the term in this “normative sense.” As you intended your question to your colleague, my spelling ‘correspondence’ with an ‘e’ was either a happy accident or a pleasant surprise, not an analytic truth. If a normative must is to have a distinctive place in the world, then, it cannot be the must either of natural law or of conceptual necessity. Natural law and conceptual necessities are “always at work,” even when we’re tired, weak-willed, lazy, disobedient, evil, or ignorant. No worry about anyone violating them. But normative guidance requires some contribution on our part, in a domain where freedom in the “non-normative” sense makes some vigilance or effort necessary.

Ethics is distinct from morality because ethics operate on some other interpretation of normativity that embodies presumptions about different arguments regarding moral facts.

**Subpoint B is the Nietzschean Argument:**

Different incompatible theories points to the non-existence of moral fact. Philosophical dialectics are only “apparent.” The theories that philosopher purport to prove are merely constructed to suit the psychological needs of philosophers.

Leiter 3

Leiter, Brian. Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement: Developing an Argument from Nietzsche. March 25, 2010. Brian Leiter (born 1963) is an [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) [philosopher](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) and legal scholar who is currently Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence at the [University of Chicago Law School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Chicago_Law_School), and founder and Director of Chicago's new Center for Law, Philosophy, and Human Values. He taught for two years at the [University of San Diego School of Law](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_San_Diego_School_of_Law), and was also a visiting assistant professor of philosophy at the [University of California, San Diego](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_San_Diego). He earned his [Bachelor of Arts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bachelor_of_Arts) in philosophy from [Princeton University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University) and both his [J.D.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juris_Doctor) and [Ph.D.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Philosophy) (in philosophy) from the [University of Michigan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Michigan).

How do these considerations, elliptical as some of them are, support a skeptical conclusion about the objective existence of moral facts? The Sophists, on Nietzsche’s account, advance two related claims: (1) that “every morality can be dialectically justified” [but] and; (2) that “all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical,” where “sophistical” [has] is obviously meant to have the pejorative connotation that the apparent dialectical justification does not, in fact, secure the truth of the moral propositions so justified. The purported dialectical justification can fail in this way if either it is not a valid argument or some of the premises are false. But, then, what is the force of the claim that “every morality can be dialectically justified”? It must obviously be that every morality can have the *appearance*of being dialectically justified, either because its logical invalidity is not apparent or, more likely in this instance, because its premises, while apparently acceptable, are not true. Yet Nietzsche goes further when he asserts that the second claim—namely, that “all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily *sophistical*”—is established (“proved” [bewiesen] he says) by the work of the philosophers from Plato through to Kant. But in what sense do the moral philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Hutcheson, Mill, Kant, and Schopenhauer et al. establish or “prove” that “all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical”? Nietzsche’s thought must be that all these philosophers appear to provide “dialectical justifications” for moral propositions, but that all these justifications actually fail. But that still does not answer the question of how the fact of there being all these different moral philosophies proves that they are sophistical, i.e., that they do not, in fact, justify certain fundamental moral propositions? Here’s how the Nietzschean explanation might go. The *existence* of incompatible moral philosophies providing dialectical justifications for moral propositions is best explained as follows: (1) there are no objective facts about fundamental moral propositions, such that (2) it is possible to construct apparent dialectical justifications for moral propositions, even though (3) the best explanation for these theories is not that their dialectical justifications are sound but that they answer to the psychological needs of philosophers. And the reason it is possible to construct “apparent” dialectical justification for differing moral propositions is because, given the diversity of psychological needs of persons (including philosophers), it is always possible to find people for whom the premises of these dialectical justifications are acceptable.

Moreover, the competing traditions indicate that philosophical discussions aren’t moving us any closer to a true morality.

Leiter 4

Leiter, Brian. Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement: Developing an Argument from Nietzsche. March 25, 2010.

With respect to very particularized moral disagreements — e.g., about questions of economic or social policy — which often trade on obvious factual ignorance or disagreement about complicated empirical questions, this seems a plausible retort. But for over two hundred years, Kantians and utilitarians have [developed] been developing increasingly systematic versions of their respective positions. The Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy has an even longer history. Utilitarians [They] have become particularly adept at explaining how they can accommodate [others] Kantian and Aristotelian intuitions about particular cases and issues, though in ways that are usually found to be systematically unpersuasive to the competing traditions and which, in any case, do nothing to dissolve the disagreement about the underlying moral criteria and categories. Philosophers in each tradition increasingly talk only to each other, without even trying to convince those in the other traditions. And while there may well be ‘progress’ within traditions — e.g., most utilitarians regard Mill as an improvement on Bentham—there does not appear to be any progress [towards] in moral theory, in the sense of a consensus that particular fundamental theories of right action and the good life are deemed better than their predecessors. What we find now are simply the competing traditions — Kantian, Humean, Millian, Aristotelian, Thomist, perhaps now even Nietzschean — who often view their competitors as unintelligible or morally obtuse, but don’t have any actual arguments against the foundational principles of their competitors. There is, in short, no sign — I can think of none — that we are heading towards any epistemic rapprochement between these competing moral traditions. Are we really to believe that hyper-rational and reflective moral philosophers, whose lives, in most cases, are devoted to systematic reflection on philosophical questions, many of whom (historically) were independently wealthy (or indifferent to material success) and so immune to crass considerations of livelihood and material self-interest, and most of whom, in the modern era, spend professional careers refining their positions, and have been doing so as a professional class in university settings for well over a century — are we really supposed to believe that they have reached no substantial agreement on any foundational moral principle because of ignorance, irrationality, or partiality?

And, moral properties don’t fit within the best explanation of the world.

Leiter 5

Brian Leiter (2001). Moral Facts and Best Explanations. Social Philosophy and Policy, 18 , pp 79-101 doi:10.1017/S0265052500002910

We can then pose the comparative question as follows: which are better explanations, moral [or natural?] explanations (hereinafter "MEs") or NEs? If [moral] MEs fare worse, then we will have (certainly defeasible) grounds for thinking that moral properties will not make it into the best explanatory account of the world. We can see that [moral] MEs are in fact inferior to [natural] NEs by [the] attending again to Thagard's two criteria. Let us consider consilience first. NEs [Natural] will always be more consilient than MEs; that is, NEs will always explain more than MEs do. This is because the mechanisms employed by NEs explain much more than just the class of "moral" phenomena (e.g., moral beliefs and observations), while MEs will only be able to explain the moral phenomena. This should hardly be surprising: after all, NEs were generally proffered as accounts of other phenomena first; only later did they find application in the moral cases. For example, the causal mechanisms underlying Freudian explanations work to explain not only morality, but also various neuroses as well as all the psychopathologies of everyday life. The application of EE to moral phenomena is a relatively recent and sometimes contentious matter; by contrast, evolutionary accounts of physiological characteristics, social phenomena, mental content, and other things abound, and many are now well-established. MEs [Moral explanations] also prove inferior [in]when we look to simplicity. MEs [They] involve additional "assumptions with narrow application"39—namely, assumptions about moral facts—that are not justified by gains in consilience. By contrast, the assumptions of [Natural Explanations] NEs—assumptions, for example, about unconscious psychic forces, microphysiological processes, natural selection, and so on—involve great gains in consilience, and thus (arguably) justify the increase in theoretical complexity that they entail. Moral properties, in short, suffer from PEN: they are too neatly tailored to only one sort of explanandum—that which I am calling the moral phenomena—for us to think that moral properties are real (explanatory) properties. The comparison of MEs with NEs should make this obvious, but even without a comparison, moral facts, like our aforementioned spirit facts, seem to suffer from PEN.

Moreover, the self-defeatingness argument doesn’t apply.

Leiter 6

Leiter, Brian. Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement: Developing an Argument from Nietzsche. March 25, 2010.

That still leaves a slightly different version of the worry that the argument “proves too much.” For surely most philosophers will not conclude from the fact of disagreement among moral philosophers about the fundamental criteria of moral rightness and goodness that there is no fact of the matter about these questions, as I claim Nietzsche does. But why not think that this meta-disagreement itself warrants a skeptical inference, i.e., there is no fact about whether we should infer moral skepticism from the fact of disagreement about fundamental principles among moral philosophers, since philosophers have intractable disagreements about what inferences the fact of disagreement supports? Again, however, we need to be careful about the data points and the abductive inferences they warrant. The question is always what is the best explanation for the disagreement in question, given its character and scope. The “meta-disagreement”—about whether disagreement in foundational moral theory really warrants skepticism about moral facts—is, itself, of extremely recent vintage, barely discussed in the literature. Don Loeb raised it in its most explicit form in an important 1998 paper (“Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement,” Philosophical Studies).

All moral determinations are contaminated by our experience.

Street ‘06

Street, Sharon. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies January 2006. Pgs 118-121

Where I think the objection goes wrong, then, is as follows. The objection gains its plausibility by suggesting that rational reflection provides some means of standing apart from our evaluative judgments, sorting through them, and gradually separating out the true ones from the false—as if with the aid of some uncontaminated tool. But this picture cannot be right. For what rational reflection about evaluative matters involves, inescapably, is assessing some evaluative judgments in terms of others. Rational reflection must always proceed from some evaluative standpoint; it must work from some evaluative premises; it must treat some evaluative judgments as fixed, if only for the time being, as the assessment of other evaluative judgments is undertaken. In rational reflection, one does not stand completely apart from one’s starting fund of evaluative judgments: rather, one uses them, reasons in terms of them, holds some of them up for examination in light of others. The widespread consensus that the method of reflective equilibrium, broadly understood, is our sole means of proceeding in ethics is an acknowledgment of this fact: ultimately, we can test our evaluative judgments only by testing their consistency with our other evaluative judgments, combined of course with judgments about the (nonevaluative) facts. Thus, if the fund of evaluative judgments with which human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with illegitimate influence—and the objector has offered no reason to doubt this part of the argument—then the tools of rational reflection were equally contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former. It follows that all our reflection over the ages has really just been a process of assessing evaluative judgments that are mostly off the mark in terms of others that are mostly off the mark. And reflection of this kind isn’t going to get one any closer to evaluative truth, any more than sorting through contaminated materials with contaminated tools is going to get one closer to purity. So long as we assume that there is no relation between evolutionary influences and evaluative truth, the appeal to rational reflection offers no escape from the conclusion that, in the absence of an incredible coincidence, most of our evaluative judgments are likely to be false.

AT: Elliot Definition

1. The AC definition still functions.
2. If Hanser outlines a different definition. Elliot is discussing ethics in practice rather than the actual theories, so prefer Hanser as it’s a more accurate representation of the way that morality functions.
3. Elliot presumes that morality exists in her book. Given that, the definition given by Elliot takes the form of “if morality exists, then permitted means within the moral system.” The AC denies the antecedent, thus her definition doesn’t function.
4. That definition only says when there **is** a concept of “permissible,” but not when there isn’t one, so it doesn’t exclude anything.